New Look in Asia

The Far Eastern crisis varies in intensity almost from day to day. There are heartening signs from Washington, however, that the long period of vacillation in American policy toward Asian problems may be nearing its end. The "agonizing re-appraisal" of united states policy toward Europe which Secretary Dulles once threatened has been transferred to Asia instead.

A welcome air of moderation, even in the face of extreme Communist provocation, has replaced the Administration's talk of "Unleashing Chiang" and "massive retaliation" against the Chinese mainland. Like Prime Minister Churchill, President Eisenhower has been pre-occupied recently with a serious consideration of the consequences of atomic war. And like Churchill, he has evidently concluded that all-out was must be avoided at almost any cost short of sacrificing national honor. Eisenhower has made it especially clear that the United states will not be led into precipitate action in the Far east, where the danger of war is most acute.

A number of Administration actions in the past few months have illustrated this new attitude. It is now well-known that the President personally over-ruled the Joint Chiefs of Staff in September when they raised the possibility of American intervention against Communist china during the hassle around Quemoy Island. The attack on an American plane off northern Japan a few weeks later gave the proponents of a "get tough" policy in the Far East still another argument. But the President insisted that the settlement of the place incident be consigned to normal diplomatic channels, a safe distance from newspaper headlines.

Evenk the Chinese announcement that thirteen Americans had been imprisoned on espionage charges did not shake Eisenhower's firm stand against direct military action. A vocal segment of the press and public opinion, led by Senator Knowland, urged a blockade of the Chinese mainland and suggested even more drastic moves. But the President rejected the blockade proposal and promised that the United states would not be "goaded into unwise actions." His appeal to the United Nations to seek the prisoners' release was a rebuff to extremist elements in the United States and a much-needed assurance to American allies that this country still intends to support the world organization actively.

Perhaps most significant of all, the Administration has realized that bullets alone are not sufficient to win the struggle for Asia. The President apparently intends to propose a large-scale program of economic assistance to non-Communist Asian countries, although the plan may have to over-come the formidable resistance of the budget-minded treasury department. The appointment of Nelson Rockefeller, a foreign economic affairs expert, to the state Department is another encouraging indication that the Administration has finally recognized the importance of the economic battle against Communism.

The acceptance of a new attitude does not assure success, of course. The Administration faces many obstacles in its effort to reduce the Far eastern crisis to manageable proportions. The Chinese communists have responded to the President's patience with contempt-once again they may have confused American desires for conciliation with weakness. The Chinese have apparently increased their preparations for an eventual assault on Formosa despite the American seventh Fleet patrol in the Formosa straits, and the dangers of an explosive incident are all too obvious. Although the Administration undoubtedly regards the new treaty with Chiang as purely defensive, there is the further danger that the Nationalists may attempt to entice the United States into a war with the Communists. In Washington itself, either the pleas of Republican leaders or the unrestrained attacks of Democrats might lead Eisenhower to seek another reconciliation with the irreconcilables in his own party.

The President's "middle of the road" philosophy too often has encouraged the Administration to sit on the fence. But the "middle of the road" approach, avoiding the extremes of appeasement and sabre-rattling, is the only way in which the United States can hope to emerge successfully from the tangle of Far eastern problems. President Eisenhower has demonstrated both courage and foresight. Above all, he has given Americans new confidence in his capacity for thoughtful leadership.