India's "Neutrality"

Columbus left his famous voyage incomplete, for in discovering America he failed to locate a quick route to India and the Orient. Americans today are trying to complete Columbus' voyage of finding a new route to the heart and mind of twentieth century Asia. And one of the largest reefs in the way of real understanding is a false conception of India's so-called "neutrality." Urging Red China's admission to the United Nations, refusing to join a Southeast Asian collective security pact, trying to put the brakes on West German rearmament--in all India's policies, Prime Minister Nehru and his top U.N. delegate, Krishna Menon, seem at first to be following a foreign policy that is consistently "neutral on the other side of the fence."

However, a closer look at India's foreign policy shows that, although it is not usually pro-American, neither is it pro-Communist. In fact, many of India's policies have worked in the West's favor. At the very start of the Korean War, for example, India strongly supported collective resistance to aggression. And India's plan for a Korean truce, which was eventually adopted, first elicited from the Soviet Union the charge of being a "camouflage for horrible American policy."

Indians are quick to point out that their policy is neither passive neutrality nor isolationism, but rather, they say, "non-alignment." They point out that India has played crucial roles in both the Korean and Indo-Chinese truces, which brought peace to both sides. Even Nehru has said that India never intends to be neutral on questions of right and wrong. In short, Indian foreign policy rests on mediation and settlement of issues where possible, but more importantly, on a firm stand for what India believes to be right.

Even strict non-alignment is difficult for some to understand in light of India's strong opposition to internal communism. Not only are India's leaders educated in the Western liberal tradition and its institutions modeled on Western democratic patterns, but India's laws against internal subversion are harsh. Many ask, why if so dedicated to democracy at home, India refuses to line up with America, which is obviously for peace and democracy.

One answer is that America's intentions are not quite so obvious on the other side of the Pacific. Educated Indians are free with their criticism of what they consider America's support for British and French colonialism. Moreover, anti-American feeling is at such a height as a result of sending U.S. arms to Pakistan, that no Indian leader, even Nehru, would be politically safe in advocating now a more friendly attitude to America.

Another reason for India's aloofness--advanced by many U.S. Foreign Service officers in India--is that Nehru knows full well that the U.S. is not going to start a general war, but is not so sure about the intentions of the Soviet Union and Red China. Thus, they argue, he is pursuing a conscious policy of appeasement. Many Indians even say that their country has no choice but to come to an understanding with its powerful neighbor, Red China. Strategically separated in the north by the Himalayas--which are, incidentally, being somewhat fortified by India--only the rice fields of Burma lie to the east. Therefore whether out of fear or friendship, India was willing to sign a non-aggression understanding with China regarding Tibet. The two nations pledged mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and, lastly, peaceful coexistence.

Although many Indians do believe in coexistence with Red China and do believe the U.S. still supports colonialism, there is a more basic reason for India's policy of non-alignment: an assumption about the way to combat Asian communism. Indians point out that in recent Asian history communism has won popular support only when it appeals to the people's desire for nationalism and economic reforms. Communism is viewed as a force to be stopped by food, education, industrialization, and village development, rather than by H-bombs and collective security pacts. Just as the U.S. in its early history avoided "entangling alliances," so India today feels it needs a long period of peace and stability to bring about a modern, progressive, democratic society.

Americans may well disagree with many of India's assumptions. But if a strong India is one hope for democracy throughout Asia, then the U.S. should think about joining arms instead of supplying them.