India: Time for No Change

In recent weeks, our relations with Asia's most important political democracy have sagged badly. Worried reports from American correspondents, and the recognition of the Communists as one of India's four largest parties have mirrored the decay of what had seemed, for the last year at least, to be a budding partnership.

A political stumble by the President did not help things. By recommending Nebraska's Val Peterson as the new Ambassador to India before he discovered Peterson was "personally obnoxious" to that state's senators, Eisenhower had to renege on the appointment after the Indian government had already blessed it. Indians could not help but have the uncomfortable feeling that Nebraska politics had priority over Indo-American relations.

Last Thursday, the President removed the Ambassadorship from domestic entanglements by recommending a capable, career diplomat, George V. Allen, for the post. But if the new Ambassador wishes to stop the recent dwindling of confidence in the U.S., he should intensify, not change, our present policy towards India.

For, during the stewardship of former Ambassador Chester Bowles, India was the testing ground of a promising Asian policy. In a land where hundreds of millions starve, there was a realization that a full belly is a better and cheaper defense against Communism than forced arms and defense treaties. When the Indian government planned economic self-development projects, the U.S. has been ready to lend technical assistance. But Bowles brooked no attempts to use American aid to shape India's economic or foreign policy in the American image. As a result, Bowles has gained an enormous following in a country which has damned Westerners for a hundred years. And India has strengthened itself against the economic crises on which Communism feeds.

Most successful, perhaps, has been the Indo-American Point Four program. A bullock-and-plow approach to the irrigation, sanitation, and agricultural backwardness of India's villages, Point Four has proven its value as an instrument of foreign policy. These results, moreover, have cost but 125 million dollars in aid. All but the most ardent Congressional "rathole" theorists have been forced to admit that this relatively small sum has equalled in effectiveness millions for defense spend in other countries.

Congressmen should not let the yappings of the economy bloc halt this Indian investment. If anything, it should be increased. Some have said that both logic and the requisites of a bipartisan foreign policy dictate Bowles' retention as advisor to the program he has sponsored. But his popularity in India is so great his presence there might detract from Allen's effectiveness. The Eisenhower administration must allow the new Ambassador to continue Bowles' program if they hope to check the sudden backsliding in Indo-American relations.