The Consequences of Chiang

Tired of waiting for Far Eastern dust to settle, tired of watching others stir it up, the Eisenhower administration decided to do some stirring on its own. Freedom for Chinese Nationalists to attack China is part of this new policy. It should surprise no one, for the Republicans enshrined Chiang and his fortunes in their platform long ago.

What prompts them to make Chiang a national hero, however, is more obscure. First, they say, it makes no sense to leave friendly troops idle when they might relieve us of some of the Korean burden. Yet, when warned that their brand of sense might force the United States into a general war, these Republicans seem to assume that Mao would no more retaliate on a large scale than cannonade a flea colony. A contradiction lurks here, though the vagaries which often pass for arguments in the GOP, especially on the subject of China, obscure it.

To go deeper, it's apparent that Republicans think flinging Chiang at China will divert Red troops from Korea. This is comfortably plausible, yet involves other events equally plausible which should make the GOP swallow hard:

A Real Nuisance

To begin with, let us assume that Chiang will be as much of a nuisance to the Communists as Republicans think he can be. Presumably, Mao will want to demolish him and his troops, a task that will require battling the Seventh Fleet. By definition, this would involve the United States in a general war with China. If Mao is sufficiently threatened, he won't hesitate to bomb Japan, assault the U.S. Navy, and engulf Korea with as many more troops as he can spare.

Further, if the United States sponsors a Chinese counter-revolution, it would only magnify the anti-U.S. zeal among Chinese. According to Korea's Ambassador to the U.S., Chinese soldiers have little genuine incentive t fight the West. If the Nationalists joined the UN in Korea, he continued (he was speaking to TV's Meet the Press panel), that would give the Communists real cause for battle.

Though he did not extend this argument himself, it is a simple matter to do it for him. Why would a Nationalist UN alliance in the middle of China have any less effect on Communist morale than the same cooperation in Korea? There would be all the more reason for denouncing America, for while the Communists were the agressors in Korea, it would be the Americans who caused a general Chinese war. Skillful propagandists (and China has many), would have a fine time with that, the result being a vast improvement in Chinese morale.

Fuel for the Third Force

There is yet another objection. What would India, Indonesia, and other such nations think of the war Eisenhower's order makes possible? In Asia, Chiang has long been identified with corruption, with tyranny (the self which ignores its subjects welfare), with almost every political vice the Asians can conceive. It will do no good to assert Chiang's new-found virtue, especially since that is doubtful anyway, nor to protest that the accusations are false, especially since many of them are quite true. Asia's contempt for Chiang is a fact, something the State Department must consider as it considers the fact of Communism itself. The loss of such valuable countries as India and Indonesia will be the reward of any administration which ignores it. Hanging the nationalist albatross around American necks is a sure way to start "third force" enthusiasts in Asia serenading Moscow.

Like a Gnat

There is also the possibility--we should say probability--that Chiang could exert all the force of a gnat against Mao. Kuomintang officials themselves have reckoned that preparations will take a year. But even Chiang's much discussed "commando raids," could do little damage unless supported by American forces. If anything, Eisenhower's order will thus have little significance save balming the torture minds of those who demand action--any action.

Insignificant and politically healthy then, this sort of mass catharsis, this action for the sake of action, is a bankrupt policy at best. It has few advantages, mostly those of domestic politics, and involves enormous risks. Surely the electorate has no need for such gestures, and surely the Republicans can reconcile that extra dose of firmness they talk about with vision.