Zoning Problem

The old Triestini cannot forget the past splendour of their city. They remember Trieste in the early days of the 1900s, a prosperous, bustling city of commerce and culture. But after two wars and an unsettling peace, Trieste has lost most of its ornate old-world charm. The seaport, once the chief Adriatic port of the Hapsburg empire, is now almost deserted. When ships do arrive, they are generally laden with United States aid.

In the fuzzy wake of the last war, the United States joined in the Allied pledge of 1948, deeding to Italy eventual control both of Zone A, the city of Trieste, plus 86 square miles below Italy, and Zone B, 199 square distria. Now the United States and Britain, without consulting either the Security Council or France, their third partner in the '48 Tripartite, have decided to woo Tito with the lure of a share in Trieste. In a declaration on October 8, the two powers announced a revision in policy: they will soon withdraw their occupation troops from Zone A, turning that area over to the Italians. The would leave Yugoslavia in control of Zone B and would shift the burden of decision in Trieste from the Allies to Yugoslavia and Italy themselves.

There has been little hint of speedy settlement between the two interested parties. Tito has threatened to march on Trieste; Italian Premier Giuseppe Pella must extract a promise from America and Britain that Italy will eventually get Zone B if he is to remain powerful in his nation's polities. And so, the two, leaders are now working at hopelessly crossed purposes, each proposing his own compromise and rejecting all others.

Conference Table Solutions

Most solutions presented so far have economic, historic, or ethnic barriers. It is up to the United States and Britain, working at the conference table with Italy and Yugoslavia, to break down as many of these barriers as possible. Often this means compromise not wholly satisfactory to either faction.

In theory the October agreement makes sense. There are about four times as many Italians as Yugoslavians in Zone A, while in Zone B the Slavs are the majority. But Triestini fear that any partition along blood liners could only be temporary and when the U. S. British occupation troops are withdrawn, Tito will quickly annex Zone A as well. There are other disadvantages in the proposal. No provision has yet been made that would guarantee Trieste as a free port. Austria and the Slavic countries need this outlet to the Adriatic, and without their trade, the port could not continue. Another practical consideration is the dependence of Zone A on Zone B to provide markets for its limited manufacturing. Italy new pays for the losses in Zone A, debts of over $20 million, but were A to be cut off from the East entirely, Italy could not afford the increased deficit.

Prestige is also a consideration in negotiations. In World War I, several hundred thousand Italians were killed fighting Austria for possession of Trieste. And on the Yugoslavian side, Tito's troops stormed the city in 1945, occupying it for 40 days. Past casualties have played a large role in elections in both countries.

And so, as tension mounts, Yugoslavia demands the Free Territory and Italy calls for a winner-take-all plebiscite, a plebiscite the Italians would almost certainly win. Any lasting solution, of course, must be worked out at a meeting of the countries concerned. The United States and Britain, it becomes more clear, will have to establish heir own policy before full-scale bargaining can begin. Such pre-conference agreements must meet certain basic requirements: Triestc must be made a free port, the Zones must not be so completely separated that the trade both sectors require is impossible. And these negotiations must save the prestige of both countries and abate the rampant nationalism which the United States has promoted in the name of European defense. Trieste is one of the world's hot sports; the United States and Britain should take action at once to limit this heat to the conference table and away from imminent hostilities.