Reischauer, Schwartz Feel Divided Korea Is Only Possible Settlement

A Western diplomat declared last week in Washington that it was of the utmost importance for observers of the current international situation to study two danger spots in the world--Korea and Germany--side by side. Korea is on the eastern rim of the Communist land mass; Germany on the western. It is inconceivable, he said, that events in the two places are unrelated.

This week the CRIMSON questioned four professors on the problems confronting the United States and the United Nations in the Far East, and in Europe. These men were: Edwin O. Reischauer, professor of Far Eastern Languages; Benjamin Schwartz, assistant professor of History and author of the recently-published "Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao;" Carl J. Friedrich, professor of Government, who has just returned from a long trip to Germany, France, Italy, Switzerland, and Austria; and William Y. Elliott, Leroy B. Williams Professor of History and Political Sciences.

The two Far East experts, Reischauer and Schwartz, expressed somewhat conservative hopes for a truce settlement in Korea in the near future. The European experts, Friedrich and Elliott stressed the necessity of continuing our policy of rearmament and Russian containment on an undiminished, if not accelerated, scale.

Reischauer Changes Views

Reischauer, who stated that he thought there was a 50-50 chance for success in the Korean truce talks, has become reconciled to a peace which would involve a split Korea. A split would be "unfortunate," he feels, "but probably the best thing available." He admits that his point of view has changed since last fall, when, before Chinese Communist intervention in the war, he stated that "a divided country is an intolerable situation for all Koreans... victory would be meaningless to the South Koreans unless we gave them unification."

Schwartz, who has a "feeling that China really wants a truce" is also resigned to a divided Korea as the best peace arrangement possible at this time.

If the truce talks fail, Reischauer thinks the U.N. would be justified in studying the feasibility of the MacArthur proposals for 1) use of Nationalist troops in Korea; 2) blockade of the Chinese mainland; 3) bombing of Manchurian and Chinese bases; 4) invasion of the Chinese mainland.

Best of the Four

Of the four proposals, Reischauer considers a full blockade of the Chinese coast the best with which to start. The others do not seem nearly so advisable to him, particularly the one advocating a landing in China. He pointed out also that "there might not be enough Chinese troops in Formosa to make the use of the Nationalists in Korea worthwhile."

Schwartz feels that the MacArthur projects would involve us in a full-scale war, in China--"just what the Russians want." Only if the tempo of the air war steps up in Korea and the Chinese Communists start using a great many more planes would we be justified in bombing Manchuria, he said.

Schwartz stated that he thought the U.N. already had a "pretty tight" blockade of China, but that if the talks failed "it might move further in that direction."

Both men felt it "highly improbable" that Russia herself would actively intervene in the Korean conflict. Reischauer thought it possible, however, that the Soviet might contribute some kind of "half-way help--perhaps so-called 'volunteer units.'"

Infinite Patience Needed

The two men expressed satisfaction with the recently-signed Japanese peace treaty, although both felt that it contained certain minor imperfections. Schwartz found it regrettable that the treaty makers did not consult with India, even if not necessarily agreeing with her. He stated that the United States should adopt a policy of "infinite patiency" toward that country.

"We must not read too much into the behaviour of the Asian countries in signing the treaty," he warned. "Their behaviour does not always express the opinion of the articulate classes. Indonesia, for instance, may have trouble ratifying the treaty at home.

"One thing is certain," he continued. "The treaty cements the Sino-Russian relationship. The one thing they have in common is fear of a strong, pro-United States Japan."

Schwartz made it clear, however, that despite this unfortunate consequence the United States had no choice but to sign the treaty.

Americans tend to overemphasize the importance of India in Asia, according to Reischauer. "She certainly wields little influence on Western Asia--the Mohammaden world--none at all on the Far East, and only some over Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia. The latter two countries signed the treaty despite her,"he pointed out. "The only danger of her attitude on the peace conference was that she might sway the Asian nations, which, it turned out, she didn't"

India Will Follow

Reischauer predicted that India would probably sign a similar treaty with Japan herself at a later date.

With regard to European problems, both Friedrich and Elliott strongly favor the recent proposals under which the West German Republic would contribute armed contingents to the North Atlantic Treaty group in return for greater national independence.

Elliott pointed out that several things must be assured the Germans before they are willing to help defend Western Europe. First, she will have to be given greater equality in the N.A.T.O. community. "Among other things," he said, "we must take away the burden of reparations which hangs over her."

Secondly, he continued, "we will have to strengthen Europe sufficiently so that Germany feels she will actually have a chance to hold the line against Russia in the event of an attack. This does not necessarily mean a bigger U.S. Army in Germany," he said, "but enough tactical air power to provide an adequate cover for armies."

While the Western Allies offer Germany a large degree of sovereignty in return for military participation in N.A.T.O. the Russians continue trying to prevent this arrangement by offering as other tempting parcel--unity with East Germany.

"We must counter Russian offers for German unification," Elliott says, "by reminding them that we have offered them (the Germans) a free, united Germany all along. We will accept Russian offers for unification any time they are willing to have free elections in East Germany, policed by an international force."

French Are Keen

Friedrich, recently back from a long trip to Europe, corroborated reports that the French are keen on having the Germans in N.A.T.O. but still strongly against having German troops serve in a German national army.

The Germans themselves, however, continue to feel increasingly unenthusiastic about serving in a European army. A poll last June of men between the age of 18 and 40 indicated that 60% did not want to serve in such as army; a more recent survey showed that 70% did not want to serve.

"This poll makes the situation seem more serious that it actually is," Friedrich continued. "The army in question probably will be composed of volunteer troops, and if 30% are unopposed to serving, that number alone represents more men than we would need."

According to Friedrich the whole European situation seems far more stabilized that it did a year ago.

Still Sick of War

"The Schuman Plan is on the books at last," he said, "and everywhere I went there was great confidence that it would eventually materialize.

"Although no one at Eisenhower's headquarters is entirely satisfied with the progress of the European army and Europe is still sick of war and wary of new devastation, progress has been made and the situation there has improved.

"The main problem in Europe seems to be the feebleness of the French Government. It is unlikely that anything can be done about it either, for there is no majority for anyone. Luckily, the preeminence of Schuman offers hope of some consistency in foreign affairs. He keeps returning in spite of all the turnovers. It is extremely unfortunate that he doesn't get the real backing he deserves."

Friedrich reported that the Europeans are worried that the United States is too convinced of the possibility of Russian belligerency; they feel that our extreme pessimism may even increase the danger of such belligerency.

Despite this sentiment on the continent, Friedrich still advocates continuance of our present program of containment. Asked if there would be a war soon in Europe, he replied "No--not as long as we carry on our present policy. As long as Russia knows she has a tough proposition on her hands, she wont' strike."

"Had we carried on this program against Hitler, he concluded, "I am convinced that he would have thought twice before starting the war."

Elliott, when asked about the possibility of a European war in the near future, stated, "There is no evidence whatsoever that Russia is not preparing to strike at any time. She continues to arm and to stockpile weapons.

Our chances for not having her strike depend on two things: 1) our atomic superiority and our supply of new weapons; 2) our ability to change the European psychology so that Western Europe will help itself and not lie over and play dead.

"If anything, we must accelerate our present program to protect ourselves for the next two or three years. Perhaps this program should place more emphasis on the development of new weapons. At any rate, we have to make up our minds what price we want to pay for Operation Survival.