BRASS TACKS

There are an estimated 200 Communist divisions sitting somewhere on the other side of the closely-guarded Elbe River-to-Triesto boundary line and, as the world situation has worsened, the leaders of the North Atlantic Pact countries have begun to worry about fitting German manpower into a defense of Western Europe. There are difficulties both inside and outside Germany itself which have thus far prevented any effective steps toward making German civilians into Western soldiers.

France has been the most determined opponent of a revival of German military power. Two invasions from the cast have been enough for any Frenchman, and the neighbor across the Rhine is still Germany, not Russia. But the French position has been modified since Korea, and France now professes herself willing to see Germans back in uniform.

When the defense ministers of the Atlantic Pact countries met in Washington two weeks ago to bring about a unified armed force for Europe, France stuck by a plan proposed by her premier, Rone Pleven: 1. that the German components of that force be limited to batallions (or regiments); 2. that Germany should receive arms under the plan only after all the other members had been fully supplied; 3. that a supra-national European defense ministry be set up; 4. that certain parts of the Schuman Plan be put into effect before there was any action on German rearmament.

Washington Decision

All that the Washington conferences could accomplish was a decision on the original contributions of each of the Pact members in terms of ships, planes, and men. In addition, they blueprinted the growth of armed forces in Europe until 1953, postulating 77 divisions by that time, including ten from West Germany. Naturally, nothing more concrete was decided about the ten German divisions, and the matter was left for the deputy ministers to take up when they convened in London last Monday.

On Tuesday, the first statement came out of the London meeting. The deputies agreed that a decision must be made on German rearmament as soon as possible, but no decisions of substance were announced.

In all these discussions lately, the United States has taken the lead in favor of an integrated German armed force, under a unified command only on the higher levels. It has generally had the support of a majority of delegates on the point, but that has not been enough to overwhelm the French objections.

Even if it were possible to persuade the French government (which is caught in a political vise between left and right and which has to face parliamentary elections next year), there still remains the problem of convincing the Germans themselves of the desirability of rearming. Germans might be happy to rearm to fight in China or India, but they know that any future war will be fought right in the middle of their own homeland.

Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's Bonn government has been struggling hard to keep away from militaristic influences, primarily for political reasons. But a national army is an important prestige symbol, and Adenauer must gain prestige for the German people in order to keep his government popular.

Schuman Plan

When the Schuman Plan for limited economic union of Western Europe was first proposed, the Bonn government clutched eagerly at it as a path back to economic and political respectability. But Adenauer's new line is that the Schuman Plan entails a sacrifice on the part of the Germans, and that this sacrifice must be paid for in increased prestige, meaning a reduction in occupation forces and a recognition that any German army must be under German control.

Then there remains the problem of how a German army would be raised. Both Bonn and the Western powers fear that an army raised from volunteers would incorporate the most warlike and dissatisfied elements of the society, the unreformed members of the Wermacht who have never quite given up on the last war and who would like nothing better than a chance to ally with the United States in an aggressive war against Russia.

Therefore, it will most likely be conscription that raises the German army of the future--conscription would include the men who have the greatest aversion to war, and consequently the least inclination to turn it loose in the wrong direction.