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The Sporting Scene

Columbia Tickets--A Sad, Sad Story

By Donald Carswell

Nobody ever gets an autograph at Braves Field. Nobody ever wants one.

Fenway Park has Theodore S. Williams. Sportsman's Park has Stanley Musial. Yankee Stadium has Joseph Dimaggio. Cleveland's Municipal Stadium has a half-dozen men whose autographs are in great demand. But Braves Field seems to have no one of even moderate pen appeal.

This is an interesting fact, especially so since the Braves won the 1948 National League pennant and are predicted to repeat this year. It is also a fact which has given this bureau a revolutionary theory on How to Win Baseball Games.

Which brings us generally up to the present season, and specifically up to the Braves opening series with the new Philadelphia "Not a cough in a carload" Phillies.

Tail-end Outfield

The score was tied, 2 to 2, with the Braves' quest-shon mark outfield coming to bat. Jim Russell singled to left. Pete Reiser sacrificed him to second. One out. Tommy Holmes grounded out, Russell moving to third on the play. Two out. Then Phil Masi was given an intentional walk--good strategy, inasmuch as the next man up was, by his own admission, the worst batter in the National League.

Pitcher Bill Voiselle batted .097 last year, quite a disappointment to the big man. He wanted his average one point lower, to match both the number on his back and his home town, Ninety-Six, S. C.

When Strategy Falls

But there he was in the "batter's box," with two out and men on first and third. Giving up on the possibility of a hit, Billy Southworth ordered Masi to steal second. In the ensuing confusion, Southworth hoped to slip Russell unobtrusively across the plate with the tie-breaking run.

But the Phillies were not to be fooled, Masi was allowed his larceny uncontested. So with runners on second and third, it was all up to Voiselle's hitting power.

Eddie Stanky, in the on-deck circle, didn't even bother to dust his hands with resin. The Braves' dug-out bustled with the activities of men preparing to go back to work.

So Voiselle slowly but deliberately rotated the bat across the plate. The ball hit it and bounced off into right field. Two runs scored, and the Braves led, 4 to 2.

All of which has been cited, simply because it is a perfect illustration of the new theory on How to Win Baseball Games. Of course, it may be old stuff to Billy Southworth; but, if so, he has been keeping it to himself.

Back to the Theory

Briefly, the theory is this: Instead of having a few power hitters on your team, you make a distinct effort to have nine average hitters, all as equally potent as possible. This may seem a bit ludicrous, until you stop and consider the effect upon the opposition's strategl.

Against the either-or (either good field or good hit) kind of team, the enemy pitcher knows exactly when he must bear down and when he can let up. It is this spacing of his greatest efforts which allows him to last nine innings.

BUT, against your team of average hitters (like the Braves), the opposition pitcher cannot space himself. He gets tired and confused. He blows the game. Other pitchers from other teams follow exactly the same pattern. In this way you win many games, maybe even--like the Braves--a championship.

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