Plan to Save

Amid the waterfall of motions, secondings, right-hand raisings, and other commonplace manifestations of parliamentary procedure that took place at last night's meeting in Adams House, one unanimous vote carried uncommon significance. The meeting, which created the Harvard-Radcliffe Committee to Save the Marshall Plan, had been dealing with the various aspects of the Marshall Plan that it felt ought to be "saved." The vote was in favor of accepting a broadly outlined four-point program, and its unanimity was significant in that it included the assent of leaders from such widely divergent groups as the Students for Democratic Action, the Harvard Young Republican Club, the Catholic Club, the United Nations Council, and the Radcliffe League for Democracy. The vote indicates a solidly realistic attitude toward the Marshall Plan among the persons at the meeting. It indicates an awareness of the fact that some sort of Marshall Plan is going to be passed by Congress, and that constructive action can only be in terms of influencing the exact outcome of that inevitable legislation. And the vote further indicates a clearcut realization that unless some sort of influence can be leveled at Congress, the Marshall Plan may well turn out to be more of a danger than a boon to world peace and international economic stability.

The Committee's ideas concerning the general line the influence should take is equally clear cut. The legislation, it feels, must provide for enough money to make the program one of recovery rather than one of relief. The legislation must provide a positive program for European aid, not a negative anti-Russian economic weapon. It must not be used as a lever to influence the internal politics of the European nations involved. Finally, it must be implemented as much as possible through the United Nations. This program has deliberately been exempted from rigorous technicalities. The Committee, again displaying sanity did not feel itself qualified to present Congress with a detailed bill. The object is simply to publicize vehemently and cogently the broad aims the Committee feels should be inherent in the Marshall Plan.

The great practical problem facing the Committee and the Executive Committee which it elected last night, is to express its views with sufficient vehemence and cogency, and to create enough popular support for them to influence Congress in this year of our election, 1948 A.D. The Republicans have been placed in a difficult position by the Marshall Plan. They have been forced to acknowledge the necessity of a European Recovery Program, but they have been prone to tinker with the Administration's proposals. It would be nicer for their political future, they feel, if they could take credit for the program themselves. This is but one example of the sort of political maneuvering which, together with the very real and complicated economic problems involved in the Marshall Plan, makes it evident that any influence will be influence in name only unless it achieves an extraordinary amount of impetus. In a few short weeks, the Committee hopes to promote a rally featuring nationally important speakers, to precipitate a shower of letters and telegrams on Congress, and to set off simultaneous rallies in a number of other colleges. It will be something of a miracle if the Committee can accomplish this program on an important enough scale. But it is a miracle well worth a major effort to achieve, both on the part of the Committee itself, and on the part of the entire community.