North Atlantic Pact

Late last week the secret draft of the North Atlantic Pact was brought from London to Washington for scrutiny by the Department of State and leaders of Congress. This pact is a tentative military alliance drawn up in London by representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux nations for mutual military action incase of an attack from the East. Its fate depends on the signature of the United States and Canada, for although the European nations plan to pool their military resources anyway, the sum total would amount to very little without definite backing from this side of the Atlantic.

The constitutionality of signing such a treaty has been discussed at length throughout the past few weeks; strictly speaking, it would be illegal for Congress to obligate itself ahead of time to declare war in the event of a Russian invasion of western Europe. Senator Vandenberg and other exports, however, have found many loopholes in this technical point which make it clear that the United States can join the pact if it wants to. The question is: should it?

Advocates of the pact maintain that since the United States is already morally committed to defend western Europe just as surely as if it were still filled with American soldiers no actual additional military obligation on our part would result from our participation. The advantages would be great. By putting our already-incurred commitments down on paper, we would do much to bolster the center-party governments on the continent by proving to the people of France and the Benelux nations that we will not desert them in case of a Russian invasion. There is still a very real segment of European public opinion that believes the United States will pull out and leave Russia to fill the power vacuum.

The main objections are the same which apply is every aspect of the "Get tough with Russia" policy; the Pact would increase the rift between East and West; it would again decrease the chances of an eventual reconciliation; and it would be an invitation for Russia to launch a retaliative measure. In other words, the Pact might become just another link in the international game of tit-for-tat which brings war closer and closer.

Dealing with such extreme generalities, involving who thinks what in terms of nations and governments, it is extremely difficult to judge the alternatives. Before the State Department's experts recommend our signing the Pact, they must be sure that this would not preclude negotiations with Russia in the future and that the psychological lift to Europe outbalances the additional irritant factor. Under these circumstances, United States participation in the North Atlantic Pact takes on the aspect of an unfortunate necessity.