Labor Referenda

Massachusetts voters will pass judgement on three proposed items of labor legislation November 2. These would: 1) ban both the closed shop and the union shop in the Commonwealth; 2) require annual election of union officers by secret ballot, and 3) prohibit any strike not authorized by a vote of the majority of all members of the striking unit.

It is natural that legislators should attempt to protect society from the abuses of bad labor leadership. It is also natural that employers--who are sponsoring the three referenda--should attempt to capitalize on a few instances of labor racketeering by using them as a springboard for all-out anti-labor offensive. In their zeal to eliminate certain patent abuses, however, the reformers and the electorate may bring to life a whole new set of labor problems which foment bad union-management relations and prove detrimental to employers, labor, and the entire community.

Union Shop and Union Security

The union shop has long been basic to union security. When a labor leader knows that every man who comes to work in the shop must subsequently join the union, he need not fear that management will be constantly undermining the union's strength and thus its bargaining position.

Without this security, the union must be eternally "tough." Leaders must constantly demonstrate the advantages of union membership. This demonstration invariably takes the form of ever-increasing demands on employers--demands in which the real interests of both workers and employers play no part:

This unhealthy situation is bad for labor, bad for management, and, as it brings on labor unrest, is bad for society as a whole. Good labor relations require that the union feel secure and be able to bargain on the merits of each issue. Any law prohibiting the union shop can only impede good labor-management relations and set the labor movement back into the dark age where it fought for its own life rather than for the good of its members.

Annual Election of Officers

A law requiring annual election of officers may react similarly to the disadvantage of industrial peace. The bill obviously aims at labor leaders who become so firmly entrenched politically that even the dissatisfaction of a majority of the workers cannot dislodge them. The problem of dealing with such leaders is indeed a great one. All honest laborites would welcome its solution.

Annual election is not such a solution. A leader who knows he must run for his job every twelve months must be constantly campaigning. He must make demands and produce wage boosts and other concessions every year if he is to keep his job. With such pressure behind him at the bargaining table, he cannot concede even to legitimate management claims. His concrete achievements must surpass even the airy promises of rival factions. The employers who propose this measure in the interests of "union democracy" are doing a disservice to the cause of good labor-management relations. And they will be creating a Frankenstein monster from which they will find escape both difficult and costly.

Majority Strike Votes

Strike votes are currently a tricky thing. Typically, only those vitally concerned in the strike issue show up, and minority meetings sends the entire plant out. The great body of workers who just don't care lose one, two, or more weeks' pay without having had a say.

The danger of requiring a majority vote of the entire working unit to call a strike is that the vast body of workers may be too apathetic politically to bother to vote. Foes of the referendum argue that the union may thus be deprived of its strike mechanism.

Such fears seem exaggerated. Going out on strike is a serious matter for the worker. For a period of time, he is giving up his livelihood to fight for something he supposedly believes in. There can be no apathy about so drastic an action. If a worker is willing to strike, the chances are that he is aware of his willingness and is ready to participate in the strike vote. In administering the law, it is important that the Commonwealth guarantee every union a convenient time and place for the balloting. Otherwise the law may damage the union's bargaining position.

Granted this condition, the majority strike vote will serve to protect the worker from being called out on a strike he does not particularly favor and will protect both labor and society from the dislocation of unnecessary and unpopular strikes. Of the three proposals, the last seems to be the only one which would improve the labor-management-relations.