Where Now Comrade?

Good may yet result from the tragi-comedy of errors which led to the separation of Henry Wallace from the Cabinet of President Truman. Despite the regrettable embarrasment suffered by the President and the State Department, the Wallace-Truman rift offers an excellent opportunity for a re-examination of the most important facet of a rapidly crystalizing American foreign policy.

The future of our foreign relations hinges on the answer to one question: "What are the aims of Soviet Russia?" Specifically, will the USSR be satisfied with security or is she planning a program of territorial expansion beyond the requirements of national safety? Russia's actions subsequent to the capitulation of Germany and Japan can be interpreted so as to support either possibility. As yet no one this side of the "iron curtain" not even the "experts" of Harvard's high-powered government department, can be sure which interpretation is correct.

To realize the paramount importance of this question, consider how simply other problems, which seem almost insoluble, would be resolved once we were sure of Russian intentions. We would know how to deal with the Muscovites in United Nations councils--Whether to be friendly and conciliating or tough and unyielding. We would know how to handle the secret of atomic power-whether to share it or guard it zealously and develop even more devestating weapons. It we were sure we could trust the Kremlin the problem of peacefully channeling atomic energy would be reduced to a difficult job of organization and administration. The deplorable friction existing between the East and the West in Germany, Austria, Greece, Poland, and numerous other areas could be greatly reduced if we were sure Russia did not intend to use these territories as spring boards to further expansion. And if we learned the worst, that Russia does not intend to rest until she had swallowed the world or a substantial portion thereof, we could begin our preparations now and perhaps convince Comrade Stalin that the price of trying to ride roughshod over the Western democracies would not be worth the uncertain profits he might reap.

But sine we do no know whether Moscow's intentions are honorable or otherwise, how can we say whether American foreign policy should be one of toughness or of compromise? We cannot; and therefore the goal of an effective foreign policy necessarily becomes the solution of this perplexing conundrum.

American officials shold secure from the Kremlin an explicit statement of whatever grants of territory or control Russia considers necessary to her safety and with which she will feel no need for further guarantees or concessions. They should also realize that our international manuevers are not seen by the Russians in the same light by which we view them, and that Russia is entitled to a forthright exposition of our aims and intentions.

If the Russian demands are so unreasonable that there is no possibility of their acceptance, we can suspect that Premier Stalin's avowals of love and friendship toward all should be immersed in an entire barrel of salt before being swallowed. If their requests can reasonably be granted we should make every effort to see that they are granted. We can then watch Russia's actions. If she exhibits a spirit of goodwill and co-operation, well and good. We can look forward to a fear free future. If, however, Moscow continues to agitate, obstruct, and demand we can expect the worst, knowing, at least, that we shall not be caught unprepared.