CONSTITUTIONAL PROCRASTINATION

With all the dilly-dallying and side-stepping of Constitutional issues now filling the current newspapers, it is a pleasant relief to find a little direct action by the members of the Law School in protest to President Roosevelt's judiciary evasion proposal. Their petition should serve as the touchstone for many more in all the Universities of the country. The Administration should be made aware that an ominous portion of his New Deal supporters are unconditionally opposed to any legal acrobatics dealing with the stability of the Supreme Court under the Constitution as it now exists.

Yesterday, in the "New York Times", Professor Edward S. Corwin of Princeton typified the whole Legislative Executive-Judiciary struggle now raging at Washington with a shining new essay, distinguished for its inconsistency. Professor Corwin, like President Roosevelt and his colleagues, is one of that specie known as "impatient liberalists"--the specie which continually bemoans the "slowness and impracticality" of the amending process. In beautiful logic, Professor Corwin proceeded from step to step, building up a magnificent case against the propriety of the Supreme Court's powers, and then abruptly deserted his theme. Instead of forcing the inevitable issue, instead of determining then and there in whom lies ultimate authority and getting it over with, he slid all the way down the bannister again and perched beside Mr. Roosevelt's policy of "expediency". In the liberal camp there is great distrust of the amending process, not because it is sluggish, but because it may turn in the wrong verdict.

The Law School's example of direct action should find its counterpart in the national sphere in the form of a proposal to determine the status of judicial review by constitutional amendment. From the Administration's viewpoint, there could be no more propitious time to carry out their reform constitutionally by amendment. Sticking by the letter of the law and not the spirit, as President Roosevelt expects to do through a sly application of his appointive power, is obviously as great a crime as any judgment the Supreme Court could possibly hand down. The crowning example of irony, however, rests in the action of a man like Professor Corwin who, after having devoted the greater part of his life to building up a logical constitutional case against judicial prerogatives, throws his full support behind a starkly unfaithful interpretation of the President's power. It is the old story--the same men who berate the Supreme Court for utilising its powers politically will deal in an exactly identical manner with the Constitution, if given the opportunity.

What this country needs, to use a little political jargon, is direct action. The Law School has set a laudable precedent. A question of such magnitude should be submitted, according to the regular amending process, to the source of all power in a democracy--the people.