Hindmarsh Does Not Expect United States To Become Involved in Hostilities With Japanese

The following article was written for the Crimson by Dean Hindmarsh.

Japan's attitude towards China involves a policy which is to be distinguished from the American Monroe Doctrine both in technique and immediate objective, although the ultimate objective of the American and Japanese policies in their respective spheres are the same. The United States, with regard to Latin America, and Japan, with regard to North China, are both interested in excluding foreign political influences which might undermine their own economic interests and opportunities in those areas. To advance this policy, Japan has been induced by the chaotic situation in North China, to adopt an outright coercive technique; the United States has been generally successful in using more subtle measures, such as financial infiltration, but we have on more than a hundred occassions since 1850 resorted to force of arms to protect our economic interests in Latin America. By using strong-arm methods Japan has rushed into political control before economic control has been completed. Other Western powers in China and the United States in Latin America are using the reverse procedure, but the ultimate commercial aims are similar.

Japan's ultimate aim is the domination of Northeastern Asia, economically at least, and politically if necessary. The furtherance of that objective, requires the neutrality of the United States so long as Russia has similar designs. In the absence of real issues between us and Japan and in the presence of an increasing realization in the United States that the requirements of peace in Asia necessitate a more realistic appreciation of the Japanese position, there is no reason to believe war will come between the two countries. War between Japan and Russia is a possibility, but it will be fought on the most convenient battle-ground in the world--Manchuria and Siberia. There, of all places, two major powers can fight with a minimum danger of involving the rest of the world, especially the United States. If we must have wars, one can hardly recommend a better fighting locus than this area. If the United States got into a war fought in that area it would be because our people wanted to fight regardless of issues. Manchuria is no Belgium, politically or geographically, and the potential belligerents would doubtless pay a decent respect to our insignificant interests there.