A MISLEADING BALLOT

For years Harvard has had all election complex. Either the lower classmen are submitted to the boredom of the perfunctory process of raising the necessary sixty per cent, or the Seniors are worked up to a nervous pitch in the effort to pay just and final honors to this or that candidate who has shown his worth throughout his college career. Indifference and over-emphasis are unhappy extremes, but luckily traditional indifference in the lower class elections can do no serious damage. If classes want to spend several days drumming up enough votes to elect nominal officers no real harm can come about as no one cares much anyway.

Senior elections, however, present quite a different problem. Quite naturally a class is anxious to be represented by men who have done most for the University and who are likely to do most for it throughout their lives. Difficulties arise from the fact that in a large, highly organized community such as Harvard, there are many different interests and consequently the task of picking the most representative members for the highest honors is not easy.

The framers of the Senior constitution have tried to devise a complicated method of election to the three marshal-ships which would overcome the difficulties. Section 5 of Article III says: "Every elector shall vote for three candidates for Marshals, indicating his preference for First Marshal. Of the three elected, the candidate receiving the highest number of votes for First Marshal shall be declared First Marshal; of the other two, the one whose total vote is higher shall be Second Marshal, and the other one shall be Third Marshal." This method of voting gives every man a chance to express his choice for First Marshal, and in a case where there is a candidate outstandingly more suited for the office, it insures his election.

Experience has shown however, that the system defeats its own ends in the more usual case of a close election for First Marshal, and often is responsible for shifting the order of the Second and Third Marshal. It is perfectly conceivable that a candidate could receive one less vote for First Marshal than the winning candidate and could be excluded from any Marshal-ship by two candidates who had very few votes for First Marshal but, who had a larger number of total votes. This, of course, is an extreme case but far from impossible. In 1920 the elected Third Marshal received 27 more votes for First Marshal than the man who was elected Second Marshal, because the latter had a few more total votes. Had the fourth candidate in this same election received four more total votes he would have received no marshalship although he got the second greatest number of votes for First Marshal and led his nearest competitor by 27 First Marshal votes. In the 1917 election a candidate lost the third marshalship by six total votes though he had 16 more First Marshal votes than the man who defeated him. Likewise in 1919 a man was moved down from Second Marshal to Third by six total votes although he had more votes for First Marshal.

In trying to create a system which would elect the three most popular candidates, the authors of the present constitution have succeeded only in insuring the election to the First Marshalship of a man who is undeniably the logical person. The Second and Third Marshals are elected by a majority of total votes, but it is a false majority and is inconsistent with the method of election of the First Marshal. The Class of 1923 elected a First Marshal who had less total votes than the Second Marshal. Such a system can only lead to confusion on the part of the voters, and to the occasional election of men who are obviously not as popular as other candidates. A straight preferential system would put the election of Marshals on a normal basis and the Class could elect the men it honored most.