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No action of the present Congress is likely to be so important as that upon naval appropriations. As a natural acquel to the charge that the American navy has fallen below the 5-5-3 ratio set up by the Washington Conference, came proposals for a building program to restore that ratio. No less an authority than Secretary Wilbur has said that the only way of maintaining the treaty ratios of the respective fleets "will be by a building program commensurate with that of the other signatory powers." He estimates the cost of such a program at $110,000,000 a year, and the time limit at 20 years, or a total of $2,200,000,000 just to keep in step.
By that American standard, which holds size to be the criterion of worth, the secretary of a big navy should be a bigger man than the secretary of a small navy. Can it be that Mr. Wilbur is haunted by dreams of greatness? If so, human frailty can pardon him his desire; but human reason cannot overlook his obtuseness in yielding to it when peace demands, net larger, but smaller navies, when public economy urges, not increased, but diminished expenditure.
The Washington Conference tried to limit competition in naval armaments by setting up the 5-5-3 ratio as a means to this end. Now Secretary Wilbur proposes to make this ratio end itself. As he interprets it, so long as the United States, Great Britain, and Japan keep to the ratio, the merry race to see which can float the most tons of steel can go or ad infinitum. It has evidently not occurred to him that competitive building is useless unless it confers an advantage upon numbers. To continue to build when an established ratio makes certain that one nation will be relatively no stronger at the end than it was at the beginning, is absurdity itself.
President Coolidge has made his position clear. He opposes any substantial increase in the American navy. In the face of claims that the British and Japanese are increasing their subsidiary ships, which were not limited by the Washington Conference, the President can still play his trump card, and call another conference to limit subsidiary building. Some say that Great Britain and Japan would welcome such a proposal. If naval rivalry is to end, this action must be taken eventually. Ordinary common sense dictates that it be done now, before more millions are sunk into ship to be scrapped. It is far more economical to scrap plans than ships.
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