TRADE AND THE TURK

Were a host of Turkish missionaries to descend upon the United States with Korans and praying rugs astounded citizens might possibly banish them to the Great American desert, as they did the Mormans. Looking at matters in this light the desire of "the" unspeakable Turk" to govern his own house politically and religiously, may seem less strange and the provisions of the Lausanne treaties made clear. For years foreign nations have been allowed extra-territorial privileges in the Porte; but the energetic young Turkish republic has docreed otherwise. As an explanation for the treaties which the Turks cleverly wrung from the Allies at a conference where they were assumed to be a conquered nation. Dr. Gates, President of Rebort College in Constantinople, writes: "The Turks were determined to become sovereign in their own domain and they were willing and prepared to, fight in order to obtain this sovereignty, which the Allies were not."

A bitter dobate is certain to mark the ratification by the new Senate of the Lausano treaty which was negotiated last August; but unless that body is willing to terminate all official relations with the Porte the treaty will probably be passed. Clearly it will mark a new stage of dealing with the "terrible Turk;" and its advantage lies in the fact that an era of good feeling is made possible by America's renunciation of the humiliating concessions which have been forced from Turkey in the past. Coupled with the treaty provisions which permit American vessals to cruise in Turkish waters this friendlier feeling should prove a stimulus to the gradually expanding Turkish American trade.

When the United States refused the mandate over Armenia there was lost practically the only opportunity for political dominance in the Near East. But even that commercial prestige which may be enhanced by the new treaty promises to be toppled by the mismanagement of the Chester concession. This huge grant, involving construction of railways, ports, and manufacturing centers, was given to Rear Admiral Chester and his associates after fourteen years of discouraging negotiations. Today it is largely in the hands of Canadian interests; although even Kemal Pasha regards it as a strictly American undertaking by which the good faith of the United States may be judged. The political and economic difficulties which face the concessionaires are perhaps insurmountable, and it is therefore the more unfortunate that America's commercial reputation is involved. There seems to be no practical path out of this tangle of politics and business; but two courses may be adopted. Either the United States must take a leaf from the English program of conducting foreign business, or she must make clear to the Turkish government that the Chester concession is not supported by the United States government. Any action is better than a passive waiting for unlikely events.