THE PRICE OF PEACE

The Washington Conference was called primarily to limit naval armaments, and thereby to reduce the present burden of taxation. Any discussion of the Far Eastern question was to be relevant only in so far as it affected this problem. Many people felt, however, that the Conference was really called to end war and establish universal peace, and nothing which the President has said has been able to discourage this idea. The explanation of this attitude is twofold; first, blind sentimentalism; and second, the realization that the Conference must of necessity go farther than its specified limits. For it is obvious that naval reduction is not of itself sufficient to preserve international harmony, because:

1.--Half a navy will attack half a navy as readily as whole navies now engage.

2.--The wars of the future are likely to see gas and airplanes taking the places of battleships.

3.--The recent wars shown economic strength and organization to be the deciding factors in modern warfare.

Consequently there is little reason to believe that the official program of the Washington Conference will eliminate all future wars.

This very position is taken by the "Paris Temps", which--feeling that strife will by no means be abolished--desires some adequate protection. It therefore proposes that the Conference adopt the following "principle", which was quoted in the "New York Times":

When the Powers agree among themselves to limit armaments, by that act, they obligate themselves, if only by implication, to go to the rescue of whichever one of them may find itself confronting a danger which its limited armaments do not enable it to overcome.

It follows, therefore, that American sentiment is correct in so far as it assumes that the Conference cannot stop half way: that is, the mere limitation of navies. In view of the general opinion of France as expressed in the above quotation, it seems logical that if navies are very much reduced some association for defense must be established among the powers. Such an association is nothing but Article X in the Covenant of the League of Nations; the proposal of the "Temps" is also identical with it. Where American opinion goes astray is in its failure to perceive that, since the Conference cannot stop half way, we again must face the problem of Article X. Whether directly through the League of Nations, or indirectly through limitation of armaments, the road to our ideal of universal peace is at present blocked by Article X. The sooner we Americans realize the futility of our sentimental revolt against "binding the free American people" to fight other nations' wars, the sooner the achievement of our own ideal will be placed on a rational basis.