"THAT FINER, NOBLER THING"

Mr. Hughes' proposals have fulfilled the hope of the most sanguine adherents of disarmament. After weeks of doubt and indefiniteness, his concrete, practicable program for the reduction of naval armaments comes as a gratifying surprise. Recent reports, the President's repeated declaration that this was not a disarmament conference, and especially the part of his Sixteen Points which dealt with armaments, have had a discouraging effect, and made many people sceptical about the results of the conference. But this sound, clear-cut proposition to reduce and limit navies, in every way practical without losing sight of the ideal, has set minds at rest and brought a wave of optimism which ought to be strong enough of itself to assure ultimate success. Now that the nation sees the possibilities, it will not be content with half-way measures.

Still more, the program assures us and assures the rest of the world as well, that the United States is so much in earnest that it is willing to go farther than the others to sacrifice certain advantages it may have, for the sake of the general good. The President's fine words of introduction were not bombast--their sincerity is more than proved by what the United States offers. His speech epitomizes what everyone would like to feel about America, but what we have been recently led to doubt. "We harbor no fears; we have no sordid ends to serve; we suspect no enemy; we contemplate or apprehend no conquest. We only wish to do with you that fine, nobler thing which no nation can do alone". The altruism of America is unquestionable.

To consider the proposal concretely, two facts stand out. In the first place, we recognize a definite ratio between the navies of Great Britain, the United States and Japan, and do not pretend that our navy must equal or surpass any other. This is a necessary expedient if the plan is to be acceptable to all, yet it clearly does not endanger our safety. Secondly, the plan calls for actual reduction as well as limitation, which is essential if the program is to be of more than temporary value.

There is still another aspect. Heretofore we have assumed that disarmament could not begin until the Eastern Question was solved. But with characteristic insight, Mr. Hughes reminds us that the two questions go hand in hand, and that there is no reason why they cannot be considered together. Thus he assures a disposition of the Far-East controversy, and at the same time arranges that the two sets of delegates, one interested in disarmament, the other in eastern affairs, may both be kept occupied, rather than that one set should wait for the other.

Adverse criticism is the easiest kind to give to such a proposal as this; yet it is difficult to find objectives for attack in its present form. The criticism that will be heard most frequently, no doubt, not only of the Hughes program but of the conference as a whole, is that it ignores the ideal--the elimination of war--and subserves everything to the ends of economic advantage. This perhaps is true; yet it is as valid for praise as for condemnation, because under the existing order we must recognize, if reluctantly, that practical considerations are the only ones which have any weight with diplomats. And through these first practical steps, the way will be opened for a more comprehensive move toward the ideal.