JAPAN'S INTERVENTION LIKELY

"Though the Japanese are holding back just at present, their intervention is Siberia is fairly certain if the German menace in the East continues to threaten," was the belief expressed by Henry Ferdinand Merrill '74, former representative of the United States Government in the East, in an interview with a CRIMSON reporter. Mr. Merrill has served in the East as Commissioner of Chinese Customs since 1874, and has travelled widely in both China and Japan, establishing postal services. He continued: "Japan's intention of not letting Germany secure so much as a foothold in the East was demonstrated by her seizure of Kiao Chow early in the conflict. Her own interests are at stake and a German victory in that quarter would mean heavy punishment for the Japs.

"The first move would be to save the military stores at Vladivostok, for at this port vast amounts of munitions and other war necessities which were intended for Russia have been accumulating. In all probability the Japs will do no more than push a comparatively short distance into Siberia, possibly to a point just north of Manchuria, and there set up a line of defences as a barrier against any eastward movement on the part of Germany. With the absolute lack of any stability in Russia and the consequent difficulty of moving troops, it would be physically impossible for forces to penetrate very far.

Japan's Intervention Logical.

"Japanese intervention in Siberia can be regarded only as a logical sequel to her policy of guardianship of the East.

"Furthermore, Japan is not at war with Russia, and would not at war with Russia, and would not be if she entered Siberia. She recognizes no Russian government, and recognizing none, can fight none; she is taking the place of that government and upholding rather than opposing it if she comes into conflict with the Russian elements which are in Siberia at present.

"China is afforded her great opportunity by the probable turn of affairs," continued Mr. Merrill. "The pressing necessity for a defence of Manchuria, together with the prospect of a strong ally for the attempt, would act as a spur on the Chinese, for the Trans-Siberian Railroad, the logical line of German advance, cuts directly through Manchuria, which is Chinese territory, and a German foothold there would mean disaster for China. Need for action must compel the Chinese to forget their present internal differences and unite as a nation. German propaganda, to be sure, has been spread in China, but the split between northern and southern provinces is due purely to Chinese politics. China is united at least in sentiment against Germany. Active resistance against the Germans, therefore, would not tend to continue the disruption, but would be the strongest possible argument for a reconciliation of the opposing factions and a permanently united China.