HARVARD WINS THE DEBATE.

The thirteenth annual Harvard-Yale debate in Sanders Theatre last night resulted in a well-earned victory for the University team. The question for debate was as follows:

"The following facts being presupposed:

1. The existence of money claims by a European government against a South American State:

2. Such claims submitted by consent of both parties to the Hague Tribunal for arbitration:

3. An award by said Tribunal in favor of the European government:

4. The time and amount of payment fixed by the award:

5. Default of payment according to terms of the award:

6. A system of absolute free trade existing in the debtor state:

Resolved. That the United States should permit the European government to seize and hold permanently territory of the debtor state not exceeding in value the amount of the award."

Harvard selected the question and Yale chose to defend the negative. The University team was composed of F. B. Wagner 1L., I. Grossman 2L. and R. LuV. Lyman '03, who gave their opening speeches in the order named. In rebuttal the order was Lyman, Wagner and Grossman. For Yale R. H. Ewell '03 spoke first, A. Fox '03, second and C. D. Lockwood 3L., third. In the rebuttal the order was Fox, Lockwood and Ewell. The main speeches were twelve minutes in length and the rebuttal five. The judges were President Pritchett of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Provost C. C. Harrison of the University of Pennsylvania and Dr. Arthur L. Brown of Providence, U. S. district judge of Rhode Island. Mr. Bliss Perry, editor of the Atlantic Monthly, was the presiding officer.

The debate, as a whole, was of a high standard. There was no suggestion of the quibbling which frequently mars such contests.

The decision of the judges was quickly and unanimously rendered in favor of Harvard. However, the Yale men were strong speakers and presented an effective case. The University team won largely because their case was based on the consideration of the interests of the whole civilized world, while their opponents considered only the interests of the United States. Harvard's contention was that under the conditions presupposed in the question the European power had an unquestionable right to seize territory of the debtor state to the amount of the award. The denial of that right by the United States would be contrary to the interests of South America, the United States and the rest of the civilized world.

The Harvard speakers presented their case with greater clearness and better emphasis than did the Yale men, and argued upon more vital points. The Yale team laid much stress on rather visionary difficulties. Harvard's central claim of absolute justice on the part of the European power they scarcely attempted to meet.

In delivery the two teams were very evenly matched, although the advantage rested with the University speakers. Wagner spoke with fluency and finish, but too little action; Ewell, for Yale, was especially direct and convincing, but sometimes made a climax in delivery when there was none in thought; Fox was rather unnatural in his style of speaking; Lockwood made up in earnestness what he lacked in variety; Lyman spoke straight to his audience and was effective, though slightly lacking in breath; Grossman, combining ease with vigor and variety, was probably the best speaker of the evening.

The Main Speeches.

Wagner began the debate and said in part: Under the presupposed facts of the question, a South American state has repudiated a just obligation which it owed to a European government. The creditor state has acted fairly and consented to arbitrate its claim. The debtor state has acted of its own free will in consenting to the Hague tribunal as a referee, and is in honor bound to accept the decision. We must presume that this decision was just, and that it set a reasonable time within which the South American country could have collected the sum and paid it.

At the moment of final default, the award of the Hague tribunal must stand as a judgment. It means immediate satisfaction at that time, and anything less would be an overthrow of the judgment. A nation should have the same right of recoupment out of a debtor's property that a judgment creditor has at common law. In international law seizure of land is recognized as a legal means. In the case tonight the creditor has chosen this immediate means of obtaining satisfaction under the award, and, between the two countries involved, this will be a just proceeding.

The United States should take the normal position of non-intervention, for a nation can not interfere between two others except for the most weighty reasons. In the present case, any intervention would be a peculiarly serious move, because it would be a challenge to the principle of arbitration. The policy of the United States has been to support international arbitration and she has been the foremost in having disputes adjusted in a peaceful method.

R. H. Ewell, the first speaker for the negative said: We agree with the affirmative that the creditor nation should have justice. But by seizing land they would not be carrying out the award of a Hague tribunal for a money payment. Our first objection to the proposition of the affirmative is that it is too broad and sweeping. Its conditions could never exist by themselves. There would inevitably be other conditions, and as these other conditions vary, the case outlined in the resolution will very in most important particulars. This resolution of the affirmative denies that the United States has any interests in South America, for if we have any interests there, we cannot allow the seizure of land under the six conditions, for these interests are as a to be menaced under these conditions as any other. The position assumed by the affirmative is also too broad because it assumes that the moment the debt falls due there is a complete break-down of arbitration. We should demand that the creditor nation make at least some effort to carry out the award before it throws it over. And, if we are to permit the seizure of land under the six conditions named, we must permit the taking of land where there is a valid claim against a South American state which refuses to arbitrate. For otherwise we would put a penalty upon arbitration and a premium upon non-arbitration, as the debtor state would keep away from the Hague tribunal.

In the second place we are opposed to the proposition of the affirmative because it is a radical departure from our policy of the past three quarters of a century. The strength of the Monroe Doctrine lies in the fact that we have allowed no exception, no opening wedge. There is many a better pretext for taking land than an unpaid claim. For the principle of seizing land in payment of money claims is absolutely unjustified by the precedents of civilized nations. In the cases the affirmative have cited land was seized by war, not by the award of an arbitration of tribunal. If we allow the seizure of land in the case of an unpaid debt, we throw open to Europe a continent that has been closed for eighty years, and our policy becomes wavering, indefinite, and inconsistent.

Grossman continued the debate for Harvard and said: The gentlemen from Yale would attach more presuppositions to the question. We must discuss a normal case, The gentlemen have suggested no means of collecting the debt other than seizing territory. By the terms of the question the European power could not seize territory exceeding in value the amount of the award. Our opponents have argued that to allow seizure of territory would be to abandon the Monroe Doctrine. We of the affirmative believe that wherever the Monroe Doctrine conflicts with justice and right, wherever it operates to destroy legal claims, wherever it prevents carrying out an arbitration award, the doctrine must of necessity yield. Yet in arguing for the temporary suspension of the doctrine under the circumstances of our case we are far from advocating its abandonment. We still retain the right to protect South American States when they deserve protection; we can still preserve republican governments when they meet their honest obligations. We shall simply refuels to uphold South American States in shameless irresponsibility and wilful wrongdoing.

In supporting this doctrine of temporary suspension we not only do justice to an honest European creditor; we also greatly benefit the South American debtor. These states according to practically all authorities are exceedingly lax in meeting their financial obligations; by threatening them with the loss of part of their territory as punishment for their laxity, we should teach them national responsibility. We should teach them, moreover, to respect the principles of arbitration, and they will learn that to consent to arbitration implies an obligation to abide by the award.

Our policy, furthermore, will teach them that they cannot in their wrong-doing hide behind the shield of the Mon- roe Doctrine; that we will not protect them in the unjust repudiation of honest obligations. Let them once lose part of their territory as a result of their own wrongdoing and they will soon eradicate the evils from which the loss arose. Any policy which allows the debt to remain unpaid after the day set for payment, would mean nullification of the award of the Hague tribunal. Not only, then, will our policy do justice to European countries, but also will it teach South American states invaluable lessons, and support the great principles of arbitration; it will give to the United States a position unique among nations; it will show European nations that there is one nation above the selfish desires of the old world.

A. Fox, the second speaker for the negative, said in part: We, too, would permit the punishment of the South American state, but not by the seizure of land. For 1000 years the history of Europe has been a history of wars and quarrels between neighboring states. The United States, on the other hand, protected from all dangerous neighbors by 3000 miles of ocean, has been free to devote all its energy to making of itself the greatest industrial nation of the world. The resolution of the a affirmative means that the United States shall give up its priceless isolation and allow Europe not only coaling stations but great bases of operation from which may be attacked our mainland, Porto Rico and the Panama Canal. It means too that we shall expose ourselves to all the nagging disputes, the friction and diplomatic entanglements which never fail to arise between neighboring states. All this, and the burden which it necessitates, is a very serious menace to the welfare of the United States.

But the United States must think not merely of the menace its self. From their birth she has watched over the little republics of South America and helped them to work out the great problem of self government. Can she now calmly see done to them the worst injustice that can be done to any state--their land taken from them? The law never takes the mechanic's tools, the lawyer's books, nor can it take the home of the bankrupt. Once allow a European state a foot-hold in South America and it will be impossible to prevent its taking more and more or even destroying the republics. The justice of the Monroe Doctrine has been recognized by England, Germany, all the world. Why abandon it now when there is no necessity of so doing; why abandon the policy of Washington and Jefferson, of Webster and Lincoln, of Cleveland and Roosevelt; the one great policy for which the United States has stood for 80 years? Why do all this for a paltry claim of money?

In the third speech for the affirmative, R. LuV. Lyman said: We of the affirmative have no desire to abandon the Monroe doctrine; we simply say that when it works injustice it ought to yield. The negative has maintained that the retention of this small section of South American territory would be dangerous to the United States. Ever since its birth as a nation the United States has been surrounded cast, south and north, by the American possessions of European powers, and her interests have not been in danger. The gentleman has wisely overlooked in his argument any danger to our mainland. He has realized that there could be none. Venezuela is 2,000 miles from New Orleans. The Rio Grande of the South and the Sao Francisco of Brazil are twice as far from the United States, as are the rivers Elbe and Weiser of Germany. The interests of the United States in the Carribean Sea are safely protected, for we hold the preponderant positions of Cuba and Porto Rico. Therefore the gentleman's argument of danger to the United States is not well founded.

But there is a danger to be contemplated by the United States under the presuppositions of our question. It is the danger of an immediate and unjust war with the European nation with whose just and legal rights the negative is arguing that the United States interfere. In 1896 we were in imminent danger of war with England when we merely insisted upon arbitration. Under our facts tonight the arbitration has taken place. The European government has chosen a legal and precedented method of satisfying its arbitrated claims. It would resent an unjustifiable interference on our part with its full naval force.

Finally, there is one danger which outweighs all others. It is the danger to international arbitration. Once establish the precedent that the awards of arbitrary boards can be interfered with and you deal a death blow to arbitration. The United States has insisted on the power to interpret arbitration of South American disputes. By what right does she now insist upon the power to interpret arbitration awards to suit here own selfish interests? The affirmative has taken its stand because we believe that in the lives of men and of nations, personal, selfish considerations must yield to the call of international honesty and fair dealing.

C. D. Lockwood closed the speeches for the negative. When we assented to the Hague tribunal, he said, we did so with the reservation that we should not be obliged to sacrifice the Monroe Doctrine. The essential meaning of that doctrine is that no European power shall be allowed to seize territory in south America. If the tribunal allowed a European power to take land in South America we should not be bound by its decision. Every one must admit that we have some interest in South America and in this debate we have shown that our interests are many. Therefore we cannot resolve, as the affirmative would have us, that whenever and wherever these six conditions exist we should permit land to be taken, regardless of what our interest at the time may be. Secondly, the negative has maintained its position by showing a policy enforced for nearly a century and founded upon principles recognized by international law.

The defaulted claim might be satisfied by ways other than seizure of land. It might be satisfied by seizing ships in reprisal as, in 1862-3, England seized Brazilian ships to satisfy an unpaid claim. Another way to enforce the money award is suggested by the question itself. By the terms of this question simply the conditions at the time of the default are given. But, if we are to make this a practical debate, evidently the fact that there is no tariff at the time of default does not prevent the creditor nation from levying a tariff. This tariff might be imposed by the creditor nation, or by a trustee. In China, an Englishman, Sir Robert Hart, acting as trustee, has for many years successfully administered a tariff. This method would be effective even if the debtor state had no money at the time of default. The fact that a country has no tariff today is no reason why a tariff should not be imposed tomorrow.

Let us now consider the practical difficulties and serious consequences of such a seizure. In what part of the country is the land to be seized? Who is to determine its value? It the interested party to determine its value? Suppose two European creditors wish the same land? In every case this land would be taken along the seacoast and must include a harbor for otherwise it would not be accessible. In this debate it has been, shown that the genera law of the affirmative is too broad to be statesman like; that it means an abandonment of a policy which we have shown a right to maintain; that it would subvert rather than further the cause of arbitration; that it would involve injustice and oppression toward the South American republics; that in every case it means actual war. It has been further shown that the very money award may be collected without actual war; that no nation should take this expensive method of satisfying a debt unless the land were desired for an entering wedge and lastly that the practical difficulties and serious consequences would be so great as to threaten the very existence of the South American republics and inevitably to draw the United States into conflict with European governments.

The Rebuttal Speeches.

Fox, in opening the rebuttal for the negative, said that we have interfered in the past. Would any nation risk a war to collect a few paltry dollars which it could collect in many other ways? In replay to the isolation of the territory seized, we say that not only England but all the European powers would obtain footholds and we would soon see the extinction of the republics. If one nation retains land others will; and so the land in South America will all be acquired by European nations with danger to the United States.

In opening the rebuttal speeches for the affirmative, Lyman stated that before there can be any seizure of land, the Hague tribunal must decide upon the claims. It is a decision of this tribunal, taken after due consideration of all circumstances, that we are discussing. Moreover, it has given ample time for payment and if the money is not forth-coming as agreed, the European government has the right by international law to seize and hold land. If the negative objects to this just claim, then they strike at the very heart of arbitration.

Replying in rebuttal for the negative, Lockwood pointed out that the debt could be collected in other ways than by the seizure of land; namely, by seizure of ships, by the collection of the internal revenues or by temporary holding. Considering love of freedom, South American republics would not allow their lands to be taken away without struggles. If the seizure is allowed in this case, it will establish a precedent which will allow seizures in all cases where there has been an award. In this way the European powers will acquire more territory than is due, and therefore we must look to the future as did President Monroe in the past. To protect the republics from oppression we must act in the old way. Once let in, the European governments will stay and grow stronger.

Answering for Harvard, Wagner said that the affirmative rested its case on the absolute right of a European nation to have a decision of the Hague tribunal enforced, since the tribunal has considered all the circumstances of the case. The wedge, which the negative fears, will be split, because the South American republics will become aroused to national responsibilities. Replying to the proposal of temporary holding, he cited England's occupation in Egypt which has resulted practically in permanent control. They say it would be a chance for Germany to get a basis for military operations, but presented to Americans in this light the case does not apply. Where is Cervera's fleet today? The time has come when the advantages or disadvantages such as Napoleon considered in his tactics must not rule the world but must give way to the higher power of international justice and arbitration.

Ewell closed the debate for Yale. Our first considerations should be in the interests of the United States and if we take the policy of the affirmative, our interests would surely be endangered. We should never abandon the policy which has served us so well for centuries. We agree with the affirmative that justice should be done; no nation in the past had trouble in collecting just debts in South America. We should permit punishment by other methods and resources, but never by the seizure of land which is the vital part of every country's existence. If one specific claim is allowed under these six conditions, no line can be drawn; other claims will be exacted and it will end in European aggrandizement to the detriment of the United States.

Grossman delivered the final speech of the debate. The position of the negative may be summed up in the quotation--"our first consideration should be the interest of the United States;" the position of the affirmative on the other hand is expressed in the quotation--"our first consideration should be the welfare of the world at large." The United states cannot say to a foreign nation that it shall not collect a just claim. If it does, then it is sacrificing the recognized principles of justice between nations for petty considerations of temporary advantages. This is sure to result in war. On account of revolutions the method of collecting internal revenues is uncertain; the method of temporary occupation results in permanent occupation. If the South American republics are to take their places among the national of the world, it is time that they assume the responsibilities of national respect and honor. Therefore in the interests of South America and in the interests of justice in the world at large, the affirmative believe that the United States should permit the permanent seizure of territory