CHANCELLORSVILLE.

Major J. F. Huntington met an audience last evening as crowded and attentive as those which have listened to the previous lecturers in the Civil War course.

Before the movement, of which the battle of Chancellorsville is the principle feature, was undertaken, the army of the Potomac was in a bad state of demoralization incident to the abortive attempts under Burnside to overpower Lee. It was the first duty of Hooker, its new commander, to reorganize it. This he did most effectively, and when he was ready to move forward he had about 130,000 men of all arms. This force lay along the banks of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredricksburg. On the bluffs behind this city, Lee was encamped in a natural stronghold with about 60,000 men flushed with victory.

Hooker determined to make the main attack a flank one on Lee's left and rear, sending Sedgwick across the river to make a feint on his right. He himself crossed the river higher up, and was ready to strike Lee before the latter was aware of the real nature of what was going on. Then a delay was made by Hooker at Chancellorsville, and before he could move forward Lee was in his front with most of his army, having left some divisions to watch Sedgwick. Hooker was now placed on the defensive, and Lee and Jackson devised a plan of attack. The army of the Potomac was badly scattered in a wooded country where half its forces were useless. Jackson, by a long flank march, struck the isolated right wing under Howard a crushing blow and sent it reeling back upon the main army. This was a complete surprise, and took Hooker completely aback. He seemed dazed, and in this emergency was knocked senseless by a shell striking a post on which he was leaning. This accounts largely for his slow and comatose action during the rest of the battle. with very little to check him, Jackson was pressing forward and had almost pierced the centre of the Union position when he was compelled to reform his men for a second attack. While reconnoitering in the dusk he was mortally wounded by a mistake of his own men.

While Jackson had been executing this brilliant movement, Lee had occupied the attention of Hooker's main force by a light attack in front. Sickles, one of Hooker's corps commanders, had, meanwhile, almost separated Lee and Jackson, and was waiting orders when the rush of Jackson's men swept up towards his own flank. Here a desperate and important struggle took place: The position in question, Hazel Grove, was occupied by some Union batteries which held the enemy in check while the crowd of fugitives from Howard's corps rushed through the line of guns to the rear. Major Huntington was himself present and in command of these batteries, and it was due to their gallant stand that the army was not totally demoralized on that day. This check at Hazel Grove compelled the confederates to wait till it was too dark for further advance that evening.

Night gave Hooker an opportunity to concentrate his army on a more compact line meager to Chancellorsville itself. In the morning, Sunday, a second desperate attack was made by the Confederates, which compelled Hooker to abandon his position and withdraw, so as to defend the road in his rear leading to the river. Here, night again brought him relief. From this last position Lee still seemed determined to drive him where his own attention was drawn aside by the movements of Sedgwick in his rear. This general had received orders from his chief to move around and meet him at Chancellorsville. Instead, on Sunday, he moved straight forward, taking Fredericksburg, after a desperate resistance by the Confederates remaining behind for its defence and to watch his movements. But all this took time, and as Sedgwick moved slowly he was very far from joining Hooker. Indeed, he was checked towards night in an attack on the Confederate force still blocking his way.

On the next morning Lee, aware of this side movement, instead of making another charge on Hooker, left only a small force to watch that confused general, and, taking the bulk of his army, determined to crush Sedgwick's corps before he could escape or receive aid. But although the latter's line was long and thin he maintained it practically intact till aided by the fog and the lateness of the hour he was enabled to concentrate his entire command about a ford in his rear and retire across the river in the night. Hooker hearing the sound of battle from his position made no diversion in aid of his subordinate, but remained inactive until he at last recrossed the river and the whole army marched back to their old camps opposite Fredericksburg. For this last movement Hooker was never able to give good reasons, for he had crossed the river at what was the most advantageous place for an attack, and now retired again when opposed by a force less than half his own. The losses on both sides had been heavy. Hooper and Sedgwick had lost in killed, wounded and missing over 17,000 men, and Lee had, by his own figures, probably underestimated, 12,000. This ended a movement of which the first part was one of the best executed moves in the history of war, but which closed as a dismal failure. There is no doubt of the gallant conduct of the troops throughout. The blame rests chiefly on hooker, and on Howard for being surprised on the right flank.